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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the Executive MBA 2014 program at the International 
Hellenic University.  
Thoroughly analyzing acquired knowledge at IHU in last 18 months and professional experience 
gathered in Serbian banking sector, I was interested on how introduction of corporate 
governance in business developed by families, small individual partnerships, privatized and 
public companies influence firms’ development in all aspects of doing business in Serbia. This 
thesis will reflect introducing corporate governance in firms, its causes and consequences. 
In attempting to establish market-based economy in the post socialist period, like other 
transition economies, Serbia has faced the serious challenges of creating the economic system, 
forming institutions and establishing incentives in order to improve economic performance. 
Corporate governance has been recognized as a crucial part of the reform process. Having 
reviewed significant interventions that have been made in corporate and security legislation in 
recent years, I will analyze recent developments in corporate governance in Serbia. In the 
following paper I will illustrate and discuss major characteristics and trends at Serbian market 
for corporate control as an external corporate control mechanism. Further, I will try on practical 
examples to show current status of corporate governance in Serbia. Those examples will cover 
various types of companies, from small entrepreneurships to market leaders recently 
privatized.  
 
Special thanks to my family, colleagues from Vojvodjanska Bank and IHU, and to my supervisor 
Mr. Alexandros Sikalidis and mentor prof. Mr. Stergios Leventis  
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Chapter I  
1.1 Introduction 
 
From the company’s perspective corporate governance can be defined as a set of rules which 
determines relationship between shareholders and managers. The definition of OECD from 
2005 says that corporate governance is: “Procedures and processes according to which an 
organization is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the organization – 
such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules 
and procedures for decision-making”1. On the other hand definition of World Bank (2009) is 
broader and says: “Corporate governance refers to the structures and processes for the 
direction and control of companies. Corporate governance concerns the relationships among the 
management, Board of Directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic development by 
enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their access to outside capital2”. 
It can be said that a more general view suggests that corporate governance represents legal, 
economic and social phenomena which are created at first through private initiative (Cadbury 
committee) which has as a basic goal to maximize efficiency of business activity and to reduce 
conflict of interest of management and shareholders.  
In the countries that don’t have developed capital market one of the most important 
mechanisms of corporate governance is concentration of ownership3. Majority of ownership is 
supposed to enable significant control over management followed by relatively small level of 
agency costs. 
Another strong and effective way to render the monitoring of management more effective is to 
improve the operations of the Board of Directors. Strong and effective board of directors is very 
important in creation of business strategy, effective monitoring of management and defining 
identity of company (Zahra, 1991). In literature two approaches are recognized, those that 
follow the idea that none executive directors enable efficient and independent monitoring of 
management (Lin et al. 2002) and those that follow the idea that none executive directors don’t 
have sufficient information about company and they are not interested in critical view of 
company’s business (Hermalin and Weibach, 1991) 
                                                     
1
 https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6778 
2
 http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_sen_eng.pdf 
3
 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/08/24/corporate-governance-in-emerging-markets/ 
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Incentive scheme for managers is one of the most common tools of corporate governance 
which is used to put in line shareholders’ interests and interests of management. Usually 
compensations are not only linked to money but also to options given to management in form 
of shares, which should more efficient put in line interests of both , since with this tool 
managers become owners of the company. History showed us that this model creates 
opportunistic desires with managers (Enron case), created false financial statements4. This case 
raised awareness on this tool of corporate governance and what happens if it’s not 
appropriately controlled.  
Also, competition over the companies or threat of takeover is one of the external mechanisms 
of corporate governance, which on efficient way does monitoring of management of the 
company. Less efficient companies can be takeover by more efficient. Very similar external 
method of corporate governance is existence of market of managers, or competition among 
managers. This method pushes managers for efficient leading of the company since there is 
always substitution on the market5. 
Full implementation of corporate governance enables efficient solving of conflict of interest 
between shareholders and managers, and at the same time protection of interests of all 
participants in business flow, from suppliers, over employees to financial institutions.  
Chapter II 
2.1 Description and analysis of “Agency problem” 
 
“An agency problem—in the most general sense of the term—arises whenever the welfare of 
one party, termed the ‘principal’, depends upon actions taken by another party, termed the 
‘agent.’ The problem lies in motivating the agent to act in the principal’s interest rather than 
simply in the agent’s own interest.”6 Corruption that is made by agents at the expense of 
principals is widely analyzed in papers of Susan Rose – Ackerman (1978)7 and Robert Klitgaard 
(1988)8. Solving the issue of so called “agency problem” is one of the primary goals of corporate 
governance. This means harmonizing relationship between owner and manager.  It is the 
problem coming from desire/need of the capital holder (owner/shareholder) to maximize profit 
for him and the fact that manager, who has desirable skills, has to do in the name of the capital 
                                                     
4
 http://www.economist.com/node/940091 
5
 See reference no.3 
6
 http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Kraakman_644.pdf 
7 Susan Rose – Ackerman (1978) International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption 
8
 Robert Klitgaard (1988): Controlling Corruption 
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holder. Manager has to do with managing things, managing of given authorization. Holder of 
that authorization is General Manager or Director of the company. Basic risk coming from this 
relationship is that manager works in his own interest, in the interest of another investor and 
not in interest of the owner. Mitigation for this risk is competition between managers on the 
market and possibility of replacement in case that supervisory body of the company notice that 
manager mislead the company or its not giving optimal output9. 
Thus, the agreement between the owner and manager has a very important role since it 
defines what the duties and responsibilities of manager are concerning profit maximization. It is 
not possible to anticipate every economic situation and to implement it in the agreement. 
Therefore, the agreement is usually limited in the sense of what is common understanding of 
role of the manager and usually is differently understood by manager and by owner of capital. 
In those circumstances, such agreement puts stronger power in the hands of managers for 
bringing crucial business decisions (residual rights). The essence of handling relationship 
between owners and managers is efficient providing residual right to managers when technical 
and overall control of manager is not possible. Managing the company requires specific 
knowledge which, usually, owners don’t have. It is impossible that those who have less 
knowledge control those that has more specific knowledge in specific area. Because of that the 
crucial goal of the owner is that manager(s) maximize the profit of the company i.e. the main 
goal of manager is to maximize the profit or value of the company. In case that manager 
maximize some other goals, e.g. personal benefits or fast growth of the sales or employment or 
something else the result would be inferior economic efficiency which is inappropriate goal 
from the corporate point of view.  
On the other hand, owners’ rights are least protected since all economic factors in the business 
environment are protected with contractual rights and obligation. Creditor interests are 
secured by various types of tangible or intangible assets or only by contractual obligations, 
suppliers too. All of them are protected even by law and bankruptcy procedure which enables 
creditors to initiate one as a way of collecting its receivables. Employee’s interests are 
guaranteed by labor law, collective agreement and individual agreements. Physical blockade of 
the company, strikes are very efficient way of claiming rights guaranteed by above said 
documents and can easily jeopardize the existence of the company in difficult market 
conditions.  
In Serbia the market of managers is not developed and practically there is no competition. In 
the period before privatization if the company was managed successfully it is good 
recommendation for new owners to keep managers in place.  In case that company is 
                                                     
9
 Agency problem in Public firms: evidence from Corporate jets in Leveraged Buyouts, Jesse Edgerton, Federal 
reserve Board 
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established by few owners i.e. partnerships (closed companies) the agency problem practically 
does not exist, but on the other hand there is problem of good corporate governance or 
problem or recognizing the moment when difficult market conditions overpass management 
ability of the owners. This is typical problem for Serbia, when company overgrows management 
ability of the owner(s). In the forthcoming sections of this paper, it will be presented case 
studies of above statement.  
In case of large listed companies, with significant market capitalization, where there is large 
number of small shareholders, agency problem is more distinguished. Also shareholders’ 
knowledge does not allow them to understand the business flow of such big companies. In 
developed economies capital market is liquid and developed and dissatisfied (small) 
shareholders can react by exchanging shares for more attractive based on their/consultant 
opinion. This is very efficient way of valuing management ability to run the company and 
represent strong tool of corporate governance. Share price value work of management, but 
managers usually knows better than stock exchange about the price (market capitalization of 
the company) especially in the countries where market is underdeveloped and illiquid like its 
case in Serbia.10 Under those circumstances, rights and possibilities that are in hands of 
managers not covered by contract are much greater than shareholders are aware. Misuse of 
those rights can be different forms e.g. manager could transfer the values of the company 
(business model, customers, suppliers etc) to another company where he is “silent” partner, 
practically owner.11 In most of the economically developed countries, those methods are easier 
to discover and managers use other, more subtly methods to gain privileges (luxury office 
space, cars etc.)  
 
2.2 Shareholders protection 
 
Shareholders’ protection is one of the main focuses of corporate governance. Shareholders are 
key elements in one company, coming from the fact that the holding capital is crucial element 
of existence of the company. They are interest group which risk they own capital thus their 
interest must be seen as most important.12  
                                                     
10
 Boris Begovic, Rajko Bukvic, Bosko Zivkovic, Bosko Mijatovic I Drago Hiber:” Unapredjenje korporativnog 
upravljanja” 2003, pg 14-16 
11
 Katarina S.Djulic: Korporativno upravljanje I koncentracija vlasnistva u Srbiji” doktorska disertacija, Ekonomski 
fakultet u Beogradu, str 25-28 
12
 Dr Zivko Kostic, dr Miroslav Milivojevic: “Ekonomika preduzeca”, Institut za ekonomiku I finasije, Beograd ,1998 
pg 62 
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Legal system of particular country is starting point of shareholders’ rights protection and can be 
grouped in 2 major groups. First is European law i.e. civil law, which is based on Roman law and 
Anglo-Saxon law which originates from English law. Within civil (European) law we can identify 
3 sub law systems: German, French and Scandinavian. European and Anglo-Saxon legal system 
are spread over the world through colonialism meaning that legal system of other countries has 
their roots in two mention broad legal systems.  
Large part of scientific literacy regarding problems in corporate governance emphasize failure 
of management to work in shareholders’’ best interest in companies with broad ownership (big 
number of small shareholders). Analyzing this problem it is concluded that when majority part 
of ownership is in hands of managers it leads to better corporate governance. This is because it 
is less likely to expect that managers who hold part of the shares would act in the way to 
decrease the value of the shares. This logic brings us to fact that agency problems would be 
minimized in companies with narrow ownership, like those controlled by families.  
In family businesses it is usual that family has controlling package of shares not in one, but 
medium to large number of companies, where in each of them has controlling package of 
shares. Those structures bring their own agency problems. Namely, while in broad ownership 
companies agency problem arises from fact if managers would perform in shareholders’ best 
interest, in family owned businesses, there is threat that managers would work in best interest 
of family but not in best interest of all shareholders. “Those agency problems are: use of 
pyramidal structures ( in order to separate ownership from control), protection of the families 
with controlling interest and non-arm’s length transaction (tunneling) performed between 
related companies which are not in best interest of all shareholders”13. 
Corporate governance in developed countries and in transition countries is very similar. 
However, practice is different from country to country even from company to company.  
In transition economies due to lack of legal protection and rule of law, especially in companies 
with small shareholders, concentration of ownership seems to be best way of protection of 
shareholders rights through corporate governance. Following rules of corporate governance in 
this concepts is very expensive, while companies that don’t show quality in applying corporate 
governance rules are very sensitive to external financing (banks/new investors). Having that 
said, corporate governance organizes not only relationship between shareholders and 
managers, but all other players (suppliers, creditors, employees). In cases seen in transitional 
economies, by becoming major shareholder it is revealed significant problems in company, such 
as undeclared supplier contract or massive dissatisfaction of employees. Investors and 
                                                     
13
 Agency problems in Large Business Groups, Entrepreneurships: Theory and Practice, 2003, Randall Morck and 
Bernard Yeung – pg 367-372 
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managers act jointly in order to solve burning problems and after that turns to their initial roles. 
By becoming major shareholder it solves significant problems, decreases need for external 
financing, has full control over managers but creates another problem which is protection of 
small shareholders. Thus this is relationship between two types of shareholders which is very 
characteristic for transitional economy. This is very sensitive area and must be done on way 
that company turns in positive track. Following table represents mechanism of corporate 
governance in transitional economies recognized by World bank (September 2004 – see link 
bellow) 
 
Table 114 
The Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Developing and Transition Countries 
 
Corporate governance 
mechanism  
 
Relative importance in 
developing and transition 
countries 
Scope for policy intervention 
Large block holders This is the most important 
mechanism of corporate 
governance in developing and 
transition countries. 
Purpose of policy intervention 
is to empower  rules that 
defend fewness investors 
without eliminating incentives  
to keep controlling blocks 
Market for corporate control this mechanism can be 
important only when 
ownership is powerfully 
centralized and should be 
remark that it may occur 
through debt contracts, but it 
is needed bankruptcy system 
As scopes of policy 
intervention we can mention 
that it eliminates some 
managerial defenses, it 
exposes the ownership and 
control and at the end it 
develops banking system 
Proxy fights Same as the previous The policy intervention has a 
                                                     
14
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/6ab71c8048a7e7b3accfef6060ad5911/Focus_ENFCorpGov3.pdf?MOD=A
JPERES 
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mechanism can be important 
only when ownership is 
powerfully centralized 
role in technology 
improvements for 
communicating with and 
among shareholders and also 
in exposure of ownership and 
control 
Board activity this mechanism can be 
important when controlling 
owner can hire and fire board 
members 
The purpose of policy 
intervention is to present 
elements of independence of 
directors, their training, and 
revelation of voting and also 
possibility of cumulative 
voting 
Executive compensation this mechanism is not so 
much important when 
controlling owner can hire 
and fire and has exclusive 
benefits 
The purpose of policy 
intervention is in the 
exposure of compensation 
schemes and conflicts of 
interest rules 
Bank monitoring we have to mention that this 
mechanism is really 
important, but depends on 
how strong and healthy is the 
banking system and the 
regulatory environment 
The policy intervention has an 
important role on 
empowering the banking 
regulation and institutions. 
Also it motivates collection of 
information on credit histories 
and also develops supporting 
credit offices and other 
information intermediaries 
Shareholder activism this mechanism is really 
important especially in big 
companies with dispersed 
shareholders 
The significant role of policy 
intervention is in motivating 
the interaction among 
shareholders, empowering 
minority protection and boost 
governance of institutional 
investors 
12 
 
Employee monitoring this mechanism is strongly 
important, especially in 
smaller companies with high-
skilled human resources 
where threat of leaving the 
company is high 
The policy intervention role is 
to expose information to 
employees or maybe to ask 
for board representation. Also 
it should secure flexible labor 
markets 
Litigation it’s a mechanism that is 
strongly connected with the 
quality of general 
implementation environment, 
but sometimes it works 
The role of the policy is to 
make easy the 
communication between 
shareholders and to motivate 
defense actions against 
excessive lawsuit 
Media and social control this mechanism is strongly 
important, but depends on 
competition among and in the 
independence of media 
The important role of the 
policy is to uplift the 
competition in media and 
through active public 
campaigns can empower 
public 
Reputation and self-
enforcement 
it is an important mechanism 
when general enforcement is 
weak, but stronger when 
environment is stronger 
In this case the role of policy 
is depended on growth 
opportunities and scope for 
rent seeking. It can inspire 
competition in factor markets 
Bilateral private enforcement 
mechanisms 
this mechanism is important, 
because they can be more 
specific, but do not benefit 
outsiders and can have 
disadvantages 
It is needed a functioning 
civil/commercial courts 
Arbitration, auditors, other 
multilateral mechanisms 
It is a strongly important 
mechanism, often the origin 
of public law. The problem is 
the implementation of it; 
audits sometimes abused and 
watch conflicts of interest 
The policy can smooth the 
formation of private third 
party mechanisms. Also can 
deal with conflicts of interest 
and can assure competition 
13 
 
Competition this mechanism defines the 
purpose for potential 
mistreatment of factors of 
production, including 
financing 
The policy can expand all 
factor markets to 
competition, including from 
abroad 
Chapter III  
3.1 Social self-management and corporate governance  
 
Back in 1950 in Serbia (then Yugoslavia) when government introduced law by which all 
management of all companies is transferred into hands of employees, so called self-
management, created very unusual derivative of ownership i.e. all companies became socially 
owned. It is old communist idea coming from Marxist theory of society. Main idea was to 
eliminate exploitation of working class from owners of capital.   
Management of the company was based on direct self-management through various bodies like 
workers’ council, referendums and other types of personal voting. It was set that all workers 
have equal votes. Workers’ council was very similar to board of directors, where workers were 
sending their representatives. The role of workers’ council was to elect general manager, 
internal audit. General privatization changed ownership structure which leads to organizational 
transformation of companies. Despite many critics addressed to socially owned companies and 
self-management, this system brought to country significant GDP growth during 60’s, 70’s and 
80’s, very skilled and educated management, low unemployment rates, never repeated in ex-
Yugoslav countries15. At that time, significant and fruitful cooperation was established with 
world known companies, especially in metal sector, like Boenig, Linde, Wabco Westinghouse, 
Fiat etc.  
 
3.2 Inside privatization and corporate governance  
 
Inside privatization in Serbia comes as a natural step, after self-management, in the mind of 
workers since they were the main factor that were providing added value to the company and 
managing with it. Thus, claiming piece of ownership was natural sequence of events for 
                                                     
15
 Dr Dragutin Marsenic: “Odnosi akumulacije I potrosnje u jugoslovenskoj privredi” pg 227 
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workers and it significantly influences the overall outlook of Serbian stock exchange in the 
future.  
Legal background of such privatization was disabled by Constitution. Based on Constitution 
which was then in force, the decision of ownership transformation could be reached, in the 
name of workers, only by self-management authorized bodies. At that point employees 
calculated what the best was for them, and they were reluctant to lose their self-management 
rights even if they will be compensated with free shares. Namely, it was believed that their 
right would be diminished to the level of vote per share, while management and managers 
would remain main factor of controlling the company and could easily neglect employees will. 
Under given circumstances privatization was partial and optional.  
First privatization law occurred during 1989 as a first attempt of turning economy from self-
management to market forces. Reluctant behavior of employees was still significantly   present, 
while state in order to motivate them to start with transitional period offered very generous 
conditions (employees were gaining property without new capital). Political turmoil during 
early 90’s turn Serbian economy to collapse and transition progress was stopped if not regress 
which led to existence of two types of ownership: private and socially owned. Economic 
environment was controlled by government supporting industries and by controlling prices, 
state owned companies had monopoly, strict control of exports and imports. On the other hand 
FX market existed based on market rules, driven by gray economy.  
Despite fact that inside privatization was not bringing inflows for state budge, was significantly 
promoted and imposed as a way of buying social peace in the country which economy was in 
knockdown, facing international economic sanctions, high unemployment rates, receiving 
refugees from ex-Yugoslav republics and constantly with war pictures over news. Offensive 
strategy of state in giving huge discounts led to hyperinflation in 1993. Federal Law canceled 
hyperinflation in early 1994 but at the same time Law on revaluation cancelled also inflator gain 
of privatized companies which practically reversed privatization, and led that Constitutional 
guaranteed rights were taken from employees. In such atmosphere, State lost its credibility16.  
Regardless lot of disadvantages, illogicalities of such economy Serbia managed to constitute 
important institutions which are common in market driven economies like; Law on legal 
entities, Law on privatization, bankruptcy procedure, foreign investments, taxes, anti-monopoly 
law, Law on accounting and auditing etc.  
                                                     
16
 Dr Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of Central Bank of Serbia 1994-1996 
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Question of corporate governance in inside model of privatization is question of efficiency, 
recognized as one of the biggest problems17. Thinking about motives of worker/shareholder 
there is unusual dilemma: 
- Is his motive to have higher salary in order to fulfill his specific needs or 
- Is his motive to renounce part of his salary in order to increase capital of the company 
and to increase value of shares thus to expect higher dividend 
In the economy with lot of uncertainties like was the case in Serbian economy, having higher 
salary now was better option for workers/shareholders and in major cases understood like that. 
History showed us that after external privatization (when foreign investors came) owning 
shares got specific weight, when workers/shareholders heavily materialize that advantage and 
benefits of inside privatization.  
One of the basic roles of privatization is to set new managing structures and that proven 
management to be appointed on critical managing roles. After second iteration of inside 
privatization when workers/shareholders started to enlarge its shares by buying them from 
indifferent shareholders, it was visible better efficiency in managing the company. All managing 
powers were transferred to Board of Directors, General Manager and controlling bodies where 
general corporate governance increased creating more efficient company. Gradually from self-
management (which inside privatization in early stage practically is) company turned to 
Shareholding Company with all characteristic of market driven companies with more or less 
efficient corporate governance.  
 
3.3 External privatization and corporate governance 
 
After democratic changes in Serbia in late 2000, during 2001 was brought new law on 
privatization18. The reason was that new government wanted to speed up ownership 
transformation and to move toward liberal economy as fast as possible. By selling majority part 
of capital should increase efficiency of economy while selling it to strategic partner problem of 
corporate governance is solved.  
Basic principle of Law on privatization (ref 18) was to sell 70% of the share capital socially or 
state owned, while the rest to be provided without compensation to the employees of the 
company or to the citizens of Serbia. Namely, by selling controlling package of shares was 
                                                     
17
 Katarina Djulic: “Corporate governance and concentration of ownership in Serbia”, PhD dissertation pg 125, 
Faculty of Economics, Belgrade 
18
 Law on privatization (Official gazette of RS nr. 38/2001)  
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assumed that new owner will fix the problem of corporate government, that will increase 
efficiency and to create better outlook. All of this should materialize in much better credit 
worthiness enabling easier indebting with banks and finally creating higher profit for investors. 
Legal framework was set that 30% of shares were distributed to employees if the company was 
sell by public auction, 15% if the company was sell by tender (with individual limits per 
employee). It is important to note that providing 30% of share capital to employees, even 
though it is significant portion of share, didn’t jeopardize corporate governance since major 
owner has significant control over management of the company.  
In following years Law on privatization was enhanced several times in order to simplify process, 
to speed up and easier to cancel privatization agreement in case of events of default. On the 
other hand there were various attempts of obstruction of privatization process where directors 
of socially owned companies that had significant influence on union, organized strike against 
privatization etc. Few good opportunities for successful privatization were missed, even till 
nowadays. 
However, from the first days of transition many things changed in Serbia regarding corporate 
governance. Implementing Law of legal entities in 2004 (Official gazette of RS nr. 125/04), law 
on establishing legal entities in 2004 (Official gazette of RS nr. 55/2004), Law on securities and 
other financial instruments from 2002 (Official gazette of SRJ  65/2002) with updates of late in 
2006 are the positive examples of regulatory framework necessary for development of 
Corporate Governance. Further, adoption and implementation of Code of corporate 
governance of Chamber of Commerce of Serbia is milestone in development of corporate 
governance in Serbia. This code should be used by all legal entities who want to be member of 
Chamber of Commerce. Beside this code in 2008 it is adopted Code of Corporate Governance of 
Belgrade stock exchange. Development of legal framework is continued with adoption of laws 
regarding operating of legal entities which are in line with EU standards.19   
 
3.4 State as shareholder and corporate governance  
 
In Serbia state as shareholder is usually present in public communal companies and reflects 
control of state over processes that fulfill general public needs, like water and electricity 
production and supply and similar services important from overall public aspect. This means 
that in those areas state has monopole which usually means lack of efficiency.  The issue is that 
losses of such companies must be covered by state budget i.e. tax obligors. Moreover, those 
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 IFC Corporate Governance Manual for Serbia, 2011, pg 41-42 
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companies are over employed which also bring additional loss. In case those services are 
transferred to private owners it raises the risk that quality of those services might be 
diminished, for the sake of profit maximization of new owners. Therefore, privatization of 
public communal companies bears not only economical risks but also very important social 
aspect. Additional perspective is around public companies. Political parties that have to bring 
decision for privatization use them as shelter for their members disregarding every principle of 
corporate governance and upgrading management to professional level.  
One of the ways to overcome these problems is joint venture between state owned capital and 
private capital, where state would have strict control over minimal level of service quality, while 
private part would take control over management. The reason why this method is not in 
massive use is that can happen that state monopole would be transferred to private hands, 
which is worse option. The best solution for monopole is introducing competition but trouble is 
that for some services introducing competition is impossible.  
 
3.5 IFC findings regarding corporate governance in Serbia20  
 
In corporate governance manual for Serbia published in 2011, IFC recognized following 
characteristics: 
- Concentrated ownership: During 90’s the ownership structure were semi dispersed , 
especially in companies which privatization is done through providing free shares and 
share acquisition under specific condition (in line with law on ownership transformation 
from 1997 – Official gazette 32/97). On secondary market, by trading with these shares, 
in vast number of cases, ownership was moved to the hands of small number of 
shareholders. In parallel with this trend, since 2001, privatization is done in the way that 
majority of privatization ended that majority of ownership was held by one or small 
number of shareholders. Having that said, it is concluded that major part of Serbian 
companies are held by one or small number of shareholders.  
- Connection of ownership and management. Most of the shareholders who controls the 
ownership of the company are at the same time general managers, member of BoDs. 
Such companies usually suffer from weak responsibility structures usually viewed in 
misuse of transfer prices with related companies and transparent disclosure of 
information’s.  
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 IFC Corporate Governance Manual for Serbia, 2011, sec1 pg 21-25 
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- Bulky holding structures: holding structures are legit way of forming business, but 
having complex and non-transparent business structures, pyramidal structures, mutual 
owning shares etc can make difficult to understand for potential investors and small 
shareholders. This kind of structures usually overpass rights of small shareholders and 
together with poor financial consolidation makes huge problem for development of 
corporate governance.  
Inexperienced and inappropriate corporate decision bodies: lack of experience in the area of 
corporate governance is huge obstacle for development of economy in Serbia. “ 
Chapter IV 
4.1 Corporate governance efficiency 
 
Generally speaking corporate governance should combine all participants in business cycle, to 
understand them, to meet their desires and to harmonize them21. Each stakeholder has its own 
goals like: 
 Owners: maximization of profit 
 Employees: salaries, working conditions 
 Buyers: quality of products/services, payment terms  
 Suppliers: regularity in payments, steady long term cooperation 
 Creditors: clear credit history 
 Society: social corporate responsibility  
 Government: regular tax payment, operating within legal framework 
Measurement of quality of corporate governance is done by LaPorta 22 and his colleagues. They 
work represents overall consideration of all factors that affects corporate governance. This 
research is called LLSV index or index of anti-directory rights. As foundation of this research it is 
set legal system and and its elements quoting: “Shareholders receive dividends because by 
voting they can change Director which is not paying them, while creditors are being paid since 
they have power to acquire collateral for their receivables” 
This index can be applied in Serbia, but interpretation deviates from core meaning of index. 
Serbian legal system, even though it has all elements, in combination with shallow stock 
exchange (underdeveloped) can’t give correct interpretation. Moreover, in country where the 
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State is the biggest debtor toward economy can’t expect that legal system would function 
perfectly. In such circumstances it is not expected high protection of shareholders rights.  
in the academic paper “The impact of ownership dispersion on quality of corporate governance 
in Serbia”23 business indicators were used to show quality of corporate governance efficiency in 
Serbia through 3 most common ownership models in Serbia. The analysis is done by analyzing 
112 companies in Serbia. Similar business indicators were used in paper “Corporate 
governance, ownership dispersion and efficiency: Empirical evidence from Austrian cooperative 
banking”24 The indicators of business performance would be Sales trends, Profitability trends, 
Cash conversion cycles, Leverage ROE, ROA etc.  
Following examples of companies with various ownership structures are presented in order to 
show corporate governance in Serbia based on above mentioned references.  Those examples 
reflect findings of World Bank researches about Serbian corporate governance: “According to 
the World Bank’s 2015 Systematic Country Diagnostic (“SCD”) for Serbia, to achieve broad 
based and sustainable growth, Serbia will need to promote higher investment,  increase 
productivity, and improve external competitiveness. It especially needs to improve its  
corporate governance and institutional capacity to implement reforms; tackle the large and 
unfinished agenda of restructuring and privatization of SOEs; make its regulatory and business 
environment more predictable and friendly; ensure that fiscal policy is sustainable; improve 
access to finance; and invest in infrastructure and trade and logistics”25 
    
4.2 Corporate governance efficiency in family business  
 
Description of companies 
Diary Kuc Company Diary Granice 
Kuč-Company ltd started in 1992 as family 
diary and one of first on territory of Central 
Serbia. It is involved in production of milk and 
milk products and has developed a dozen of 
Company Granice ltd began his operations in 
1993, also as family business, with 50 liters 
of milk capacity per day. Now it is a modern 
dairy farm, among the top ten in Serbia, 
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products, with the certified quality 
Up to 2012 the client was selling mostly on 
domestic market with small participation of 
export to Bosnia, Macedonia, Croatia and 
Albania and from 2012 started with export to 
Russia 
Up to beginning of 2015 the client developed 5 
sales channels: wholesale, retail - through 15 
specialized shops, Franchise - there are 39 
retailers who are selling mostly products of Kuč 
Company. Generally, they are receiving 15% 
rebates, paying in 1-2 day, and have consent of 
Kuč Company to sell products of other 
producer only if Kuč Company doesn't have it 
in own assortment.   
daily process 80,000 liters of milk  
The milk is processed into 15 different 
products (milk, yogurt, buttermilk, sour 
cream, cheese etc), which are sold in 
approximately 2,000 retail stores. The 
largest market is Belgrade (about 40%) 
which supplies a large number of retail 
stores.  
Company Granice has provided to its 
subcontractors/suppliers modern equipment 
for milk cooling (coolers). It cools milk after 
milking, stored and kept at the optimum 
temperature of 4 degrees Celsius.  
The company Green energy group int doo 
was established in 2009. Company owns 
land planted with apple orchard. Agriculture 
is the main activity of company.  
 
Financial performance in period 2011-2014 
Company managed to record sales growth of 
14%. Having in mind strong competition in this 
sector recorded growth is considered as 
achievement. In given period EBITDA margin 
stagnates and ranged from 5-7% of sales. Net 
profit was marginal, firstly cause of low upper 
profitability, but also can be attributed to the 
mentality of Serbian companies to present the 
lowest net result possible in order to avoid tax 
payment.  
Structure of balance sheet changed in the way 
that company turned to illiquidity. Namely, 
working capital melted from €890k to -€570k in 
observed period. It means that needs for 
external financing in the form of short term 
In respective period company recorded 
growth of 34%. Moreover, EBITDA margin 
showed increasing trend from 10% to 16%. It 
is connected that enhanced cooperation 
with suppliers (providing them with modern 
equipment), which provided high quality of 
raw milk. This cooperation gave excellent 
results. Net result was significant, while net 
margin in last two years reached 12%, which 
is considered as best bench mark in industry. 
Owner (family) started to disburse dividends 
in observed period but never more than 50% 
of realized profit. 
Balance sheet well structured. Working 
capital increased to €2.6m creating strong 
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loans increased significantly. It is important to 
note that company in 2008 started with 
vertical integration of business by construction 
a cow farm, in order to secure stable supply of 
milk and not to be dependent from huge 
number of small suppliers. Apparently 
investment done didn’t give expected outputs 
and started to suffocate the company. The 
reason was that animal food at that point was 
highly unfavorable. Company was not able to 
decrease its indebtedness due to lack of 
improved profitability. Return on assets was 
very low (5.1) while current ratio descends 
from year to year. Company increased short 
term borrowings in order to finance daily 
operations since it couldn’t find extended 
payment terms on suppliers’ side. With 
marginal profitability, repayment capacity of 
the company was heavily distressed.  
liquidity buffer. External funds were used 
exclusively for purposed of increasing 
profitability (e.g. advance payment of 
suppliers which will provide 
discounts/rebates etc) and for Capex 
expenditures. Capex was strictly used for 
enlargement of capacity and to follow high 
end standards.  
Leverage of company is far below 1, and 
return on assets almost 20.  
Corporate Governance overview  
Person which engage personal fund for starting a company, takes over a risk of investment, 
becomes owner and manager at the same time. As company develops, tasks are more 
complicated, market is more demanding and proper leading of company requires more 
knowledge. Manager has to monitor, overview, plan, motivate and to integrate all the skills 
that doesn’t have, and for him it’s managerial challenge. In example given above, in Kuc 
Company, lack of knowledge about the investment performed in order to create vertical 
integration led company to the heavy illiquidity. At the time when owner/manager realized 
that investment is going to fail or is not going to give expected return, it was too late for 
defensive strategy. Part of responsibility bears creditors which were blinded with gaining 
profit in short period, enabled to uneducated manager to enter in so big investment that can 
lead company to bankruptcy. This was clear case when lack of corporate governance 
endangered the existence of the company. The size of company and volume of the business 
overcome the ability of manager and his skills. Recognition of this case is the crucial part in life 
of family owned business.  
The second company showed much better financial results. With same level of sales, Granice 
recorded significantly better upper profitability gross margin of 32% vs 27% in Kuc. The 
22 
 
production process is also more efficient in Granice, evidenced in lower operating leverage 
creating EBTDA margin on 15.9% vs symbolic 1.3% in Kuc. Consequently, without having own 
capital to support business activity, Kuc looked for external sources creating financial leverage 
13.8 xs higher than Granice. Finally ROA of Granice reached almost 20% which is 3.7x more 
efficient than Kuc.  better understanding of market and its conditions. It developed from small 
to medium size company. Manager/owner showed decent level of corporate governance in his 
firm. On the other hand, excess of liquidity was not engaged in core business but in some 
other business, thus development of the company is slowed down. The business diversification 
was done consciously, since owner/manager recognized moment when his company reached 
to the point when further investment will upgrade the company on level which is out of 
manager/owner comfort zone. Lack of corporate governance is viewed in the fact that owner 
is not willing to engage professional management, sacrificing growth of the company. Such 
behavior bears it own risk, and the biggest one is that developing competition can endanger 
market share in midterm basis. In this case size of the company threaten to overcome the 
ability of manager, but the case was recognized but still not acted in best interest of the 
company. Lack of will to engage professional management was overwhelming factor.  
 
4.3 Corporate governance efficiency in partnership companies  
  
Description of companies 
Cool Food ltd Kartonval ltd 
Coolfood ltd was established in September 
2009. The ownership structure is the following: 
Slobodan Tanaskovic with 25%, Anja Kopcalic 
with 50% and Nikola Ralic 25%. Partnership 
was created between individuals where Mr. 
Tanaskovic has huge experience with suppliers, 
Ms Kopcalic is major capital owner, and she 
provided initial capital, while Mr. Ralic has 
contacts on Russian market. The individual 
qualities of three shareholders were supposed 
to create synergy effect.  
Coolfood is wholesaler and distributor of fresh 
fruits and vegetables focused on Serbian and 
Kartonval Doo –was founded in 1998. The 
main activity is the production of cardboard 
and of cardboard transport packaging in the 
quality and the dimensions of the customer 
order. Three individuals are owners Mr. 
Petkovic 25.5%, Mr. Jovanovic 25.5% and 
Mr. Popovic with 49% of shares.  
The Production of cardboard is done in their 
premises in Sabac, in industrial zone and 
head office is located in Belgrade. Company 
building their position on a market for years, 
increasing number of buyers, does not 
depend on one supplier, continuously 
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much more Russian market. Supplier base is 
created by cooperatives in region of town 
Smederevo, which secure desired quantity 
under Serbian/Russian standards. Warehouse 
is rented and nature of business is seasonal. 
The highest turnover is created in last quarter.  
improving their business activities, 
supported by periodically  S/T borrowings 
from banks, but especially  with quality 
product and professional staff this risk 
appears low 
Financial performance in period 2011-2014 
For the first three years of observed period, 
company had stable sales of €1m, while in 
2014 recorded significant drop of sales of over 
65% amounting minor €380k. EBITDA margin 
shrinking to even loss in 2014. However net 
result was always positive followed drop of 
sales and in 2014 was positive due to some 
extraordinary incomes.  
Balance sheet very humble. It shows that is 
strictly trading company. Problem arises when 
company small buffer of working capital used 
to finance fixed assets (together with banking 
loan) i.e. piece of agricultural land for the 
purpose of having orchard. Without working 
capital, company stayed out of the market, 
facing almost liquidation.   
Sales were stable in observed period 
amounting c. €20m excluding peak in 2012. 
Peak was result of short term deal. Gross 
margin varied from 24.4% to 18% and 
depended on market conditions and ability 
of the company to collect receivables. 
Receivables turnover varied from y-o-y, from 
64 to 80 days adjusting to current market 
condition, also confirming upper statement. 
OpEx participation in sales always had 
decline trend from 16% in 2011 to 11% in 
2014, confirming management ability to deal 
in difficult market conditions. In order to 
maintain its market share, management 
used promotions, rebates and similar tools, 
evident in high negative extraordinary result 
in some years (€390k in 2012 and €302k in 
2014) but always taking care not to 
jeopardize its bottom profitability , maintain 
it (EBTDA margin) above 6% with exception 
of 2013, when gross margin recorded 
historically lowest level of 18%. 
Fixed assets adequately financed, always 
from capital and long term loans. 
Reasonable dividend policy, leaving 
company at leverage of 1.5. Liquidity buffers 
strong ranging from €4.6m to €2.5m, while 
turnover ratios constant, maintaining always 
good credit risk reputation with banks and 
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making itself as the most desirable client for 
the banks.  Liquidity excess kept ih highly 
liquidated assets (other current assets refer 
on deposit and placement in placements in 
T-bonds).  
Corporate Governance overview 
In situation when is small number of shareholders it is common existence of principal-principal 
problem. It means that exist conflict between majority shareholder(s) with minority 
shareholder(s). In countries where legal framework is not strong like in Serbia, the probability 
of existence of such conflict is greater. There are some mechanisms to prevent this problem 
like strengthening of Board of Directors, strict rules regarding management compensations, 
existence of independent audit etc. In case of Coolfood, it is evident that for some period of 
time company managed to operate. What is noticeable is the fact that retained earnings were 
not kept into company (even though company didn’t present dividend payout, shareholders 
decided to disburse them in indirect way), clearly showing that shareholders didn’t have 
mutual trust, that their objectives were different and that they were looking for dividends. 
Problem principal-principal is evident, significantly escalated in 2013 when company, using 
personal connection managed to acquire bank loan to invest into agricultural land. Profit 
margin decreased and in next year problems accumulated. Company almost became loss 
maker, ROA and ROE was not existed where indebtedness went to the roof. Problem arise 
from lack of corporate governance made company to bankruptcy since in 2015 company was 
idle, banks were claiming its receivables through taken collateral. 
On other side we have, production company which makes quite stable profit with stable sales 
excluding peak in one year. This is example where problem principal-principal is well managed. 
The major owner has least managerial power in the company, since other two are well 
educated and devoted to company. Synergy between 3 owners created strong company, one 
of the market leaders. Moreover, since market share of cardboard production is dived 
between 3 players, company was looking for investment opportunities. Even in this stages, 
corporate governance were adequate evident in 2012 where company made peak in sales and 
profitability but due to business reasons exit from temporary investment as decides to risky at 
that time. Through period excess liquidity is kept on safe side ready to be materialized in 
investment, but as seen, managers are patient and careful in deciding where and how to 
invest. Transparent dividend payout is not endangering either liquidity or solvency of the 
company. It is example of adequate corporate governance (at least for Serbia), but at the same 
time managers took very passive role. In other circumstances, if the managers would need to 
address to shareholders (shareholders which are not managers) it is less likely they would 
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keep their positions since they are not maximizing shareholders’ profit. Keeping significant 
amount of money on deposits for period of 4 years is lack of initiative and certainly could be 
found other ways of investments with higher rates of return.  
 
4.4 Corporate governance efficiency in joint stock companies 
 
Description of companies 
Zlatar plast jsc Energoprojekt holding jsc 
Three consortium hold over 60% of shares. 
Each consortium does not have more than 
21%, while consortiums are consisting of 
individuals. Action fund of state owns 6% while 
the rest is in possession of small shareholders.  
Managing bodies are: General assembly, Board 
of Directors, Controlling body and General 
Manager 
Company was established in 1989 as part of 
much bigger industrial corporation. In 2000 
was privatized and since then remain joint 
stock company. It is established for purpose of 
production plastic packaging for beverages, 
fruits and vegetables. As company grew, they 
bought (privatize company in bankruptcy) 
another nearby facility for production rubber 
products and they constructed cooler storage 
capacity of 1500tons.  
Sales were focused mainly on domestic market 
(80%) while the rest is export. Company has 
wide range of customers, mainly beverage and 
beer producers since 70% of sales refer on 
plastic program.  
 
Energoprojekt Holding is the parent 
company of Energoprojekt Group, a complex 
business system integrating 9 companies 
(construction or construction related 
companies) in Serbia along with over 20 
subsidiaries and joint venture companies 
abroad. Through its network of regional 
branches, subsidiaries, joint ventures and 
other corporate entities, Energoprojekt 
controls projects in 24 countries across four 
continents with current active project 
portfolio in excess of EUR 450 mil.  With 
consolidated revenues in excess of EUR 200 
mil, it is the second largest business Group in 
the Country. Shareholders structure of 
Energoprojekt Holding a.d. are Auction state 
fund with 24%, the second largest 
shareholder holds 9% while the rest no more 
than 4.5% 
Shares of Energoprojekt Holding  have been 
traded at the Belgrade Stock Exchange from 
May 7, 2001 and according to the degree of 
realized trade they belong to the most liquid 
shares at our financial market. From July 19, 
2007, shares of Energoprojekt Holding Co. 
have been included in the A listing of the 
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Belgrade Stock Exchange, where currently, 
apart from Energoprojekt, there are only 
three more listed companies 
Financial performance in period 2011-2014 
Company in given period recorded stagnation 
of sales at the level of €5.5m while in 2014 
recorded sales growth of 36% amounting 
€8.1m. The EBTDA margin showed decreasing 
trend, making company enable to repay debts. 
Working capital gap increased over years since 
long term loans were exchanged for short term 
and total indebtedness of company didn’t fell. 
Financing structure worsen. It happened 
because long term loans were not long enough. 
In 2014 when creditors realized that company 
is going to default, they made reprogram of 
liabilities, again swapping short term to long 
term. Managers engaged excess liquidity and 
recorded sales increase. It happened that 
aggressive sales strategy was not good as 
significant number of receivables turned to be 
doubtful and had to be impaired. Company 
didn’t enhance its repayment capability.  
Sales had up and down trend till 2013 while 
in 2014 was recorded growth of 46% 
amounting €287m. Since its construction 
group of companies, up and down trend is 
reasonable. Sales coming from enganig in 
vast construction campaign in Russia 
connected with winter Olympic games in 
Sochi. Profitability margins with industry 
bench marks with understandable volatility 
depending on current market conditions. 
Very good structured balance sheet and well 
guided in respective period. Dividend policy 
varies, but never left company with leverage 
over 1.1. No signs of doubtful receivables 
that could endanger either profitability or 
repayment capacity of the company. Net 
debt has strong increasing debt from €4m at 
begging of period and amounting €33m at 
end of respective period. In that period 
group over doubled its fixed assets while net 
debt / EBTDA ratio never above 2.5x.   
Corporate governance overview  
In companies with large number of small shareholder principal-principal problems can happen 
but only if group of shareholders which has majority ownership act against disunited small 
shareholders. The basic problem is how to ensure that professional management act in the 
best interest of owners, also known as agency problem about which was discussed above. In 
case of Zlatarplast, successfully privatized company after a decade of operations came into 
situation that unskilled management lead a company to high illiquidity with practice that total 
net profit is disbursed to shareholders as dividends. In period before observed, investment 
were financed on non-appropriate way, the tenor of investment facilities were not adequate, 
i.e. too short, thus made company to exhaust all its liquidity for repayment of loans. As soon 
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as creditors reprogramed short term loans company managed to create liquidity which 
enables sales increase. Bad management in the past left consequences since in the period of 
lack of liquidity, company was not fallow its investment cycle, ending with highly depended 
production on few buyers. 
In Energoprojekt, by analyzing its output it can be concluded that management of the 
company is high professional level. Company has highly developed level of corporate 
governance starting from Board of Directors, general assembly and ability of management to 
foreseen upcoming events in such economy like Serbian. Diversified portfolio of project in 
distant countries like Peru, Nigeria, Kazakhstan where use its experience, skilled employees is 
additional proof of high corporate governance ability. Company is very rare example of 
successful privatization where professional management shows high level of corporate 
governance awareness evident that share of company is blue-chip on Belex.  
 
 
Chapter V 
5.1 Summary and overview of corporate governance in countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
 
Despite full control and no agency problem in family owned (no possibility of management 
misuse) since the owner is the manager at the same time is not guarantee of successful 
business performance. Owner runs the company and develops it to the certain business level. 
In this ownership segment company growth is slowed due to not attractiveness for the banks 
since they don’t have credit history. At the moment when they reach this status and start using 
banking loans it is not rare case that lack of medium term or long term financial management 
lead to bankruptcy. Taking over other companies is another model of company’s growth. For 
the acquisition it is used method of internal and external financing, where predominantly is 
used inadequate tenor of financing, usually too short, while source of internal financing is 
working capital which leads to either overinvesting or not expected growth or to long term 
illiquidity. Lack of professional management is the key characteristic if this kind of companies26.  
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In partnership companies, problem may arise between partners when controlling owner misuse 
its position on the expense of other owner “principal-principal” problem27. Existence of such 
problem is possible in Serbia where legal framework and non-legal (capital market, banks etc.) 
are modest in protection of minority shareholder. There are some mechanisms of protection of 
shareholders, which are tools of corporate governance and refer on:  
- Strengthening of BoD efficiency 
- Regulation of inter-companies transactions 
- Regulation of conflict of interest 
- Proper Information disclosure  
- independent auditing  
About effects of corporate governance in family business and partnership companies shows the 
results of privatization process in Serbia after 2001 under model of minimum ownership of 
70%. Research of socio economic council of Serbia under sample of 471 privatized companies 
out of total 1266 privatized companies from 2002 till 2011 conclude the following. Out of all 
privatized companies in the given example, 23.3% perform business activity continuously. In 
13.6% of cases, buyer (participant in privatization) improved technical capacities of the 
company more that it was required by privatization agreement. In 3.9% new owner didn’t 
invest required amount while 3.6% of new owners disposed assets of company. What is 
characteristic of this research is that 131 company was deleted (closed) from Business Registry, 
while 53 was in bankruptcy procedure which gives very high percentage of 44% bankrupt 
companies out of all privatized28. If this data is projected on whole economy and takes into 
account the companies that doesn’t employ anybody, it is confirmed estimation that during 
privatization process almost three quarters lost their job (74.1%) employed in social –public 
sector29. 
“Large dispersion of ownership in companies, despite possibility of existence of agency 
problem, forces the management to show better business performance. Still it needs 
improvement of corporate governance mainly through: 
- transparency in doing business 
- better compatibility of financial reports with international standards, 
- more efficient protection of small shareholders, 
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- entering companies into stock exchange”30 
Before final conclusion about corporate governance in Serbia, please see bellow common 
characteristics of corporate governance in countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Albania, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina): 
Political and economic system of those countries was very similar in the past, and even though 
transition period didn’t start at the same point, corporate governance in these countries has 
some similarities (Pučko, 2005).  
- Managerial position is usually concentrated in one person or small number of persons 
which are shareholder(s) with majority part of shares.  
- When above is not the case, managers are trying to accumulate votes in order to 
increase its power.  
- Due to followed privatization models workers have power to influence structure of 
corporate governance, 
- Trained and skilled professionals are rarely members of top management and BoDs.  
 
Albania 
Law on “Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies” (no 9901) sets legal framework for 
corporate governance in Albania. This Law also covers establishment of rep offices and 
branches. It is given period of 3 years for all legal entities to alight with new law. Main 
characteristics of Albanian market are the small and medium enterprises are more than 80% of 
whole economy, while among them majority refers on family business.  
 
Croatia 
Development of corporate governance in Croatia is set parallel with the processes of 
privatization and market economy institution building (Tipurić et al, 2004: 255292) especially 
with Law on legal entities (no 118/03). Croatian economy is characterized with large number of 
small shareholders as a result of two turns of privatization process in 1991 and 1996.  
 
Slovenia 
Corporate governance is shaped by privatization process in 90’s when 40% was kept by state (or 
state/public related companies) while the rest was sold either to resident or non-resident legal 
entities/individuals. It is characterized with low level of ownership concentration and gradually 
decreasing employees as owners companies (Gregorić, 2003; Knezević Cvelbar, 2006).  
 
 
Bosnia and Hercegovina 
Bosnia and Hercegovina is the country where exists two types of corporate governance due to 
very unique political regime where exists two political entities, Federation and Republic of 
Serbian. In Federation entity it is adopted American model of corporate governance and in 
Republic of Serbian it is adopted German model. Institutional and legal framework of corporate 
                                                     
30
 Same as ref 27, pg 149 
30 
 
governance is being established since 1998 and is in constant process of upgrading 
(Šunje,2007). Main characteristic is concentration of ownership and still underdeveloped 
legal/regulatory framework. 
 
5.2 Conclusion  
The quality of corporate governance in Serbian in transitional and post transition period is low. 
On showed examples even successful companies have signs of week corporate governance. 
After finished privatization and also in family business the owners were led with motive of 
private wealth, which led to significant number of bankruptcy procedures (even 44% of 
privatized companies finished in bankruptcy)31. In open joint stock companies there is no direct 
control of management. Being like that it opens lot of space for misuse of managerial 
discretion, especially phenomenon of asymmetric information. Despite the fact that in such 
ownership structure was engaged more quality management, due to lack of managerial market, 
competition among managers and more transparent incentive scheme, misuse were very often.  
Privatization itself was not sufficient method to increase efficiency of corporate governance 
since successful rate was low and as we saw on examples even in family business where agency 
problem is not expressed, lack of quality in corporate governance creates none optimal 
financial result. It comes from mentality issues, meaning that managers were raised, educated 
and gaining experience in totally different economic and political environment.  Continues lack 
of confidence in state institutions, rules of law and free market, created atmosphere that 
manager should have full control of all aspects of business cycle even though his knowledge 
was not on that level. High quality corporate governance decreases the possibility of having 
asymmetry in information circulation between owners of capital and managers. It creates 
preconditions for increased profitability on the level of company and consequently on the level 
of whole economy. It is important to increase corporate governance awareness, educate 
managers and adopting laws that would help to reconcile relationship between all economic 
factors. General impression is that managers, board members and shareholders of Serbian 
companies are both unaware of their rights and responsibilities and insufficiently educated in 
the area of corporate governance.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Financials of family owned companies  
 
Kuč ltd Granice ltd 
Report type Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Reference date 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Period (months) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Income statement 
        Sales 10,253 9,775 10,727 11,698 9,329 10,419 13,096 12,524 
- Cost of goods sold 7,713 7,176 7,939 8,489 6,988 7,589 9,314 8,537 
Gross operating income 2,540 2,599 2,789 3,208 2,341 2,830 3,782 3,987 
+ Other operating income 90 53 13 19 
  
13 1 
- Operational expenses 1,970 1,948 2,281 2,493 1,438 1,565 1,804 2,008 
Operating income 660 704 521 734 903 1,265 1,991 1,980 
- Interest expenses 306 265 253 276 
 
1 9 20 
+ Extraordinary results -84 -264 -89 -307 30 -204 106 26 
EBTDA 270 175 178 151 933 1,060 2,087 1,986 
- Depreciations and amortizations 102 78 54 58 229 264 296 338 
- Taxes 11 -163 27 7 -79 3 182 166 
Profit after tax 157 260 97 86 783 793 1,610 1,483 
Dividends 
     
495 795 512 
Total Assets 
        Cash 104 17 25 26 448 363 1,029 412 
Accounts receivable 1,525 1,698 1,773 1,534 1,266 1,317 1,404 1,435 
Other current assets 883 1,134 679 173 371 390 344 2,135 
Inventories 1,035 1,120 1,169 1,477 586 719 1,145 1,131 
Total current assets 3,547 3,969 3,647 3,210 2,672 2,788 3,923 5,114 
Long term claims 
 
2,306 2,397 2,309 
   
189 
Intangible assets 49 53 76 115 
    - Accumulated depreciations 
        Tangible assets under construction 
  
127 424 
   
233 
Tangible assets 3,288 943 818 1,078 2,372 2,404 3,094 3,216 
- Accumulated depreciations 
        Total tangible and intangible assets 3,337 3,303 3,417 3,926 2,372 2,404 3,094 3,638 
Total assets 6,884 7,272 7,064 7,135 5,044 5,193 7,016 8,752 
Equity and Liabilities 
        Accounts payable 986 1,223 1,709 1,837 686 588 661 769 
Accruals 47 22 40 12 22 
 
10 16 
Short term bank loans 1,505 2,243 1,422 1,775 122 462 866 1,741 
Debt amortization 
        Other current liabilities 132 132 133 153 4 14 126 
 Total current liabilities 2,669 3,619 3,304 3,777 834 1,064 1,663 2,526 
Long term bank debt 2,627 2,071 2,362 2,369 
 
35 
 
172 
34 
 
Other long term liabilities 235 102 7 
     Total long term liabilities 2,862 2,173 2,369 2,369 
 
35 
 
172 
Stock 159 130 130 125 14 13 501 483 
Reserves 10 22 22 21 6 5 5 5 
Retained earnings 1,184 1,328 1,239 842 4,191 4,076 4,847 5,565 
Total capital and reserves 1,353 1,480 1,391 989 4,210 4,094 5,353 6,053 
Total liabilities 6,884 7,272 7,064 7,135 5,044 5,193 7,016 8,752 
         Report type Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Reference date 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Period (months) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Working capital 
        Working capital 878 350 342 -567 1,838 1,725 2,260 2,587 
Cash flows statement 
        EBTDA 
 
175 178 151 
 
1,060 2,087 1,986 
- Taxes 
 
-163 27 7 
 
3 182 166 
- Change in debtors 
 
173 75 -240 
 
50 88 31 
- Change in other receivables 
 
251 -455 -505 
 
19 -46 1,791 
- Change in inventories 
 
85 49 308 
 
132 426 -13 
+ Change in suppliers 
 
237 486 128 
 
-98 73 108 
+ Change in other current liabilities 
 
-25 20 -9 
 
-12 122 -119 
Operating cash flow 
 
41 989 701 
 
745 1,633 1 
- Change in tangible and intangible assets 
 
43 169 567 
 
296 985 882 
Free cash flow 
 
-3 820 134 
 
449 648 -881 
- Dividends 
     
495 795 512 
+ Change in capital 
 
-133 -186 -488 
 
-414 445 -271 
+ Change in long term liabilities 
 
-689 195 1 
 
35 -35 172 
+ Change in short term bank debt 
 
738 -821 353 
 
340 404 875 
Total cash flow 
 
-87 9 1 
 
-86 667 -617 
Financial Ratios 
        Sales growth (%) 
 
-4.65 9.74 9.05 
 
11.68 25.69 -4.37 
Gross margin (%) 24.77 26.59 25.99 27.43 25.10 27.16 28.88 31.83 
EBTDA (%) 2.63 1.79 1.66 1.29 10.00 10.18 15.94 15.86 
Net margin (%) 1.53 2.66 0.90 0.73 8.39 7.61 12.29 11.84 
ROA (%) 6.72 7.42 4.88 5.10 15.53 15.51 26.53 19.06 
Reinvest rate 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 37.58 50.59 65.50 
Leverage (1:) 4.09 3.91 4.08 6.22 0.20 0.27 0.31 0.45 
Receivable turnover (in days) 54.30 63.41 60.34 47.85 49.54 46.12 39.14 41.82 
Inventories turnover (in days) 48.98 56.98 53.75 63.49 30.63 34.57 44.86 48.37 
Payable turnover (in days) 46.65 62.19 78.58 79.00 35.83 28.28 25.90 32.87 
Current ratio 1.33 1.10 1.10 0.85 3.20 2.62 2.36 2.02 
Quick ratio 0.94 0.79 0.75 0.46 2.50 1.95 1.67 1.58 
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Appendix 2: Financials of partnership companies  
 
Kartonval ltd Cool Food ltd 
Report type Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Reference date 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Period (months) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Income statement 
        Sales 20,352 26,152 19,283 20,817 1,083 1,083 1,163 383 
- Cost of goods sold 15,703 19,776 15,810 16,681 938 938 1,008 342 
Gross operating income 4,649 6,376 3,473 4,136 145 145 155 41 
+ Other operating income 98 189 76 67 
    - Operational expenses 3,160 3,919 2,231 2,239 46 46 108 71 
Operating income 1,587 2,646 1,318 1,964 98 98 47 -30 
- Interest expenses 303 635 560 397 17 17 17 10 
+ Extraordinary results 227 -389 77 -302 -25 -25 -11 50 
EBTDA 1,510 1,623 835 1,266 57 57 18 10 
- Depreciations and amortizations 358 471 274 333 
  
5 5 
- Taxes 58 36 -205 157 2 2 
  Profit after tax 1,095 1,116 766 776 55 55 13 5 
Dividends 219 494 
 
45 
    Total Assets 
        Cash 574 313 207 349 33 33 1 3 
Accounts receivable 4,427 4,639 4,240 3,894 24 24 32 91 
Other current assets 844 2,952 5,194 4,853 9 9 48 52 
Inventories 7,617 5,245 2,669 3,021 3 3 77 189 
Total current assets 13,463 13,148 12,311 12,118 70 70 158 335 
Long term claims 21 2,607 3,396 3,927 
    Intangible assets 7 10 9 13 
    - Accumulated depreciations 
        Tangible assets under construction 
  
614 863 
    Tangible assets 4,593 3,578 3,699 3,624 39 39 248 513 
- Accumulated depreciations 
        Total tangible and intangible assets 4,621 6,195 7,718 8,428 39 39 248 514 
Total assets 18,084 19,343 20,029 20,545 108 108 406 848 
Equity and Liabilities 
        Accounts payable 1,945 3,898 2,751 3,343 5 5 84 12 
Accruals 35 20 22 232 
  
1 30 
Short term bank loans 7,692 6,093 4,820 5,923 22 22 93 662 
Debt amortization 
        Other current liabilities 71 43 40 70 
  
3 3 
Total current liabilities 9,742 10,054 7,633 9,568 27 27 182 707 
Long term bank debt 616 1,725 4,034 2,876 
  
129 46 
Other long term liabilities 7 4 34 24 
    
36 
 
Total long term liabilities 623 1,729 4,068 2,900 
  
129 46 
Stock 1,628 1,468 1,652 1,594 
    Reserves 1,568 1,393 1,213 1,188 
    Retained earnings 4,522 4,699 5,463 5,296 81 81 94 96 
Total capital and reserves 7,719 7,560 8,328 8,078 81 81 95 96 
Total liabilities 18,084 19,343 20,029 20,545 108 108 406 848 
         Report type Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Reference date 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Period (months) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Working capital 
        Working capital 3,720 3,094 4,678 2,550 43 43 -24 -372 
Cash flows statement 
        EBTDA 
 
1,623 835 1,266 
  
18 10 
- Taxes 
 
36 -205 157 
    - Change in debtors 
 
212 -399 -346 
  
7 60 
- Change in other receivables 
 
2,107 2,243 -341 
  
38 4 
- Change in inventories 
 
-2,372 -2,575 352 
  
74 112 
+ Change in suppliers 
 
1,954 -1,148 592 
  
79 -73 
+ Change in other current liabilities 
 
-43 
 
240 
  
4 29 
Operating cash flow 
 
3,550 623 2,276 
  
-19 -209 
- Change in tangible and intangible assets 
 
2,044 1,797 1,043 
  
214 271 
Free cash flow 
 
1,507 -1,174 1,233 
  
-233 -480 
- Dividends 
 
494 
 
45 
    + Change in capital 
 
-780 2 -981 
   
-3 
+ Change in long term liabilities 
 
1,106 2,339 -1,168 
  
129 -84 
+ Change in short term bank debt 
 
-1,599 -1,273 1,103 
  
71 569 
Total cash flow 
 
-261 -106 142 
  
-32 2 
Financial Ratios 
        Sales growth (%) 
 
28.50 -26.27 7.95 
  
7.36 -67.08 
Gross margin (%) 22.84 24.38 18.01 19.87 13.36 13.36 13.32 10.75 
EBTDA (%) 7.42 6.20 4.33 6.08 5.23 5.23 1.56 2.62 
Net margin (%) 5.38 4.27 3.97 3.73 5.05 5.05 1.11 1.20 
ROA (%) 7.73 9.35 6.73 5.78 66.47 66.47 11.83 2.31 
Reinvest rate 80.01 55.70 100.00 94.21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Leverage (1:) 1.34 1.56 1.40 1.54 0.33 0.33 3.28 7.84 
Receivable turnover (in days) 79.40 64.74 80.26 68.28 8.22 8.22 9.95 86.96 
Inventories turnover (in days) 177.06 96.80 61.62 66.10 1.01 1.01 27.87 201.87 
Payable turnover (in days) 45.21 71.95 63.50 73.14 1.89 1.89 30.48 12.31 
Current ratio 1.38 1.31 1.61 1.27 2.59 2.59 0.87 0.47 
Quick ratio 0.60 0.79 1.26 0.95 2.50 2.50 0.44 0.21 
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Appendix 3: Financials of Joint stock companies 
 
Zlatar Plast ad Energo Projekt Holding consolidation 
Report type Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Reference date 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Period (months) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Income statement 
        Sales 5,482 5,548 5,972 8,176 203,180 230,666 195,492 287,140 
- Cost of goods sold 3,141 3,368 3,937 5,278 54,214 84,899 59,683 93,217 
Gross operating income 2,341 2,180 2,036 2,898 148,966 145,767 135,808 193,923 
+ Other operating income 25 20 
  
1,270 2,549 2,576 1,864 
- Operational expenses 1,953 1,714 1,666 1,948 136,268 137,309 130,591 179,114 
Operating income 413 485 370 951 13,967 11,008 7,794 16,673 
- Interest expenses 54 62 93 263 4,070 2,714 2,392 2,845 
+ Extraordinary results -82 -159 71 -286 7,288 5,223 5,275 4,555 
EBTDA 277 264 348 401 17,186 13,517 10,677 18,383 
- Depreciations and amortizations 182 164 166 185 11,546 4,567 5,336 7,472 
- Taxes 4 5 29 29 777 1,019 1,274 2,137 
Profit after tax 92 95 153 187 4,863 7,931 4,067 8,773 
Dividends 100 102 55 45 440 524 568 4,658 
Total Assets 
        Cash 9 19 65 75 28,849 29,670 27,275 26,423 
Accounts receivable 528 412 295 926 73,386 62,921 62,186 98,171 
Other current assets 424 448 294 16 31,881 33,065 32,193 34,360 
Inventories 2,046 1,331 1,126 1,125 43,790 27,023 31,543 36,942 
Total current assets 3,007 2,211 1,781 2,142 177,905 152,679 153,196 195,896 
Long term claims 10 8 66 8 11,619 13,840 14,460 16,097 
Intangible assets 33 34 32 30 810 623 536 583 
- Accumulated depreciations 
        Tangible assets under construction 
   
602 
  
478 663 
Tangible assets 6,068 5,533 5,561 4,698 75,002 74,448 85,574 126,937 
- Accumulated depreciations 
        Total tangible and intangible assets 6,110 5,574 5,659 5,338 87,431 88,910 101,048 144,280 
Total assets 9,117 7,785 7,440 7,480 265,336 241,589 254,245 340,176 
Equity and Liabilities 
        Accounts payable 1,333 909 1,158 1,036 74,636 54,325 53,263 64,425 
Accruals 60 42 33 59 14,368 6,981 12,799 31,604 
Short term bank loans 1,389 1,977 2,166 708 25,150 24,316 31,289 30,473 
Debt amortization 
        Other current liabilities 326 436 375 220 15,484 14,323 14,521 17,535 
Total current liabilities 3,108 3,363 3,733 2,024 129,638 99,945 111,872 144,037 
Long term bank debt 1,888 767 
 
1,763 7,183 8,340 4,045 4,574 
Other long term liabilities 
   
29 522 8,524 8,604 28,767 
Total long term liabilities 1,888 767 
 
1,792 7,705 16,864 12,649 33,341 
Stock 1,875 1,690 1,690 1,630 51,166 48,639 54,594 51,664 
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Reserves 1,836 1,601 1,546 1,438 37,839 35,693 33,743 61,884 
Retained earnings 411 364 471 596 38,989 40,448 41,387 49,251 
Total capital and reserves 4,121 3,655 3,707 3,664 127,994 124,780 129,724 162,799 
Total liabilities 9,117 7,785 7,440 7,480 265,336 241,589 254,245 340,176 
         Report type Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Reference date 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Period (months) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Working capital 
        Working capital -101 -1,152 -1,953 118 48,267 52,734 41,324 51,859 
Cash flows statement 
        EBTDA 
 
264 348 401 17,186 13,517 
 
18,383 
- Taxes 
 
5 29 29 777 1,019 
 
2,137 
- Change in debtors 
 
-116 -117 631 9,769 -10,465 
 
35,985 
- Change in other receivables 
 
24 -154 -278 3,871 1,184 
 
2,167 
- Change in inventories 
 
-714 -205 -2 3,558 -16,767 
 
5,399 
+ Change in suppliers 
 
-424 249 -122 9,484 -20,311 
 
11,162 
+ Change in other current liabilities 
 
92 -69 -129 7,167 -8,548 
 
21,819 
Operating cash flow 
 
733 974 -231 15,862 9,687 
 
5,674 
- Change in tangible and intangible assets 
 
-372 251 -136 12,847 6,046 
 
50,704 
Free cash flow 
 
1,105 723 -95 3,015 3,641 
 
-45,030 
- Dividends 
 
102 55 45 440 524 
 
4,658 
+ Change in capital 
 
-460 -46 -184 16,121 -10,620 
 
28,960 
+ Change in long term liabilities 
 
-1,121 -767 1,792 -12,090 9,159 
 
20,692 
+ Change in short term bank debt 
 
587 190 -1,458 -5,686 -835 
 
-816 
Total cash flow 
 
10 46 10 920 821 
 
-852 
Financial Ratios 
        Sales growth (%) 
 
1.20 7.65 36.89 4.42 13.53 
 
46.88 
Gross margin (%) 42.71 39.29 34.08 35.45 73.32 63.19 69.47 67.54 
EBTDA (%) 5.05 4.75 5.82 4.90 8.46 5.86 5.46 6.40 
Net margin (%) 1.67 1.71 2.56 2.28 2.39 3.44 2.08 3.06 
ROA (%) 1.60 1.86 3.22 6.03 3.49 4.20 2.54 3.91 
Reinvest rate -9.02 -6.75 64.22 75.70 90.94 93.39 86.05 46.90 
Leverage (1:) 1.21 1.13 1.01 1.04 1.07 0.94 0.96 1.09 
Receivable turnover (in days) 35.14 27.12 18.05 41.34 131.83 99.56 116.11 124.79 
Inventories turnover (in days) 237.74 144.27 104.43 77.79 294.82 116.18 192.90 144.65 
Payable turnover (in days) 154.91 98.52 107.41 71.68 502.49 233.56 325.73 252.26 
Current ratio 0.97 0.66 0.48 1.06 1.37 1.53 1.37 1.36 
Quick ratio 0.31 0.26 0.18 0.50 1.03 1.26 1.09 1.10 
 
